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Abstract: Traditionally, the term nuclear arms control is strongly associated 
with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or Russian-American bilateral agree-
ments. Besides the US-Russia regime, there is at least one more interesting case 
in the world, which certainly deserves attention — a specifi c case of India-Pakistan 
relations in this fi eld. These two countries had to interact in a very peculiar regional 
and bilateral context, and thus they have formulated their specifi c understanding 
of basic concepts of nuclear arms control. The world’s current situation is devel-
oping towards revising nuclear arms control mechanisms and possible expansion 
of multilateral formats of arms control negotiations. Although these states possess 
nuclear weapons, they are outside the current nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
Yet, Pakistan and India could be potentially involved in the extended format 
of the debate. So, the understanding of their bilateral practices addressing nuclear 
arms control mechanisms is necessary for the initiation of a constructive discussion 
with them. The measures taken by the two Governments are not regarded as arms 
control in the classical Western approach to research in this fi eld. Still, the authors 
suppose reviewing the Pakistani attempts to establish the peculiar South Asian 
bilateral nuclear arms control between India and Pakistan.
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Аннотация: Традиционно термин «контроль над ядерными вооружениями» 
прочно ассоциируется с Договором о нераспространении ядерного ору-
жия или двусторонними российско-американскими соглашениями. Однако, 
помимо американо-российского режима, в мире существует по меньшей мере 
еще один прецедент, безусловно заслуживающий внимания — индийско-
пакистанские отношения в этой сфере. Этим двум странам приходится взаи-
модействовать в своеобразном региональном и двустороннем контекстах, что 
оказывает влияние на формулирование собственного понимания ключевых 
концепций контроля над ядерными вооружениями. Текущая ситуация в мире 
развивается в направлении пересмотра механизмов контроля над ядерными 
вооружениями и возможного расширения диалога посредством использова-
ния многосторонних форматов. Пакистан и Индия, как государства, облада-
ющие ядерным оружием, но находящиеся вне нынешнего режима ядерного 
нераспространения, могли бы быть вовлечены в расширенный формат обсуж-
дения. Таким образом, понимание особенностей их двусторонних практик 
необходимо для начала конструктивного диалога с ними. Несмотря на то что 
меры, принимаемые правительствами двух стран, не рассматриваются как 
контроль над вооружениями с точки зрения классического западного подхода 
к исследованиям в данной области, эта статья предполагает обзор деятель-
ности Пакистана в установлении двусторонней системы контроля над ядер-
ными вооружениями в Южной Азии.
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The article presents a Pakistani view on the bilateral nuclear arms control sys-
tem within its relations with India. The view is based on the opinion of Pakistani 
experts in the domain. However, the specifi c feature of the examined fi eld of studies 
in Pakistani is that the expert community has strong ties with the decision-makers 
and C2 institutions that represent either retired or active military offi cers or offi -
cials, deeply involved in the process. Thus, the view seems to be consolidated, but 
due to the ability of experts to make statements in a personal capacity, there is an 
opportunity to have room for a discussion.
Relations between India and Pakistan are pregnant with multiple problems that 
have been gradually developing since their independence in 1947. The confl icting 
nature of the bilateral relationship provoked three full-scale wars over Jammu and 
Kashmir and numerous border confl icts of various intensity. But the year 1974 
became a benchmark date. That year a new nuclear power had emerged in South Asia 
when India tested a nuclear device for the fi rst time. It was the fi rst case in the NPT 
regime history, that a state, which refused to sign, ratify and obey the treaty, con-
ducted a nuclear test. Although the nuclear explosive device was not a weapon, 
and the test was declared peaceful-purpose, it infl uenced regional security climate 
and severely affected regional players’ national security, fi rst and foremost — that 
of Pakistan. The vivid discussions began in Pakistan and the words of Pakistan 
then-prime minister Z. Bhutto: if India acquires nuclear status, Pakistan will have to 
follow suit even if it entails eating grass’, got a chance to become a reality [Wolpert 
1983]. Pakistan decided to go nuclear.
Twenty-fi ve years later, in May 1998, the countries reached the point of no return, 
when both nations decided to demonstrate their nuclear capabilities by conducting 
weapons tests. It served as the ground for revising the policies that countries were 
pursuing to ensure national security, also providing a new opportunity for dialogue. 
Relations in this area have many features dictated by the unique context of develop-
ment since both countries have developed their nuclear weapons programs and their 
doctrines in their unique ways.
Nowadays, the nuclear non-proliferation regime is moving towards a crucial 
arms control mechanisms revision. More and more talks address the possible 
expansion of the arms control negotiations formats by multilateral dialogue. Thus, 
both India and Pakistan represent a defi nite point of interest as states possessing 
nuclear weapons but adhering to resistance to ‘nuclear apartheid’ staying aside from 
the existing regime. So, the understanding of their bilateral nuclear arms control 
mechanisms is necessary for launching a constructive dialogue.
India and Pakistan develop their nuclear forces and strategies in the situation 
of mutual hostility and distrust. That forced them to try to increase their nuclear 
capabilities constantly. As well as the absence of a full-fl edged dialogue in the fi eld, 
this is determined by the fact that, despite a long history, the military nuclear programs 
of both countries are only forming. And one can compare it with the uncontrolled 
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development of nuclear technologies in the USA and the USSR in the 40s-60s 
of the twentieth century [Khan Z. 2013].
These factors cause concerns not only in the region where both nations oper-
ate. They also attract the attention of experts worldwide, including Russia. Russian 
experts such as Alexey Arbatov, Vladimir Sotnikov and others made attempts to raise 
the awareness of the problems discussing the possible ways to reduce nuclear risks 
in the region [Ядерное противостояние 2005]. Nuclear doctrines of both states 
of the South Asian dyad also attract the attention of international experts [Сотников 
2020; Perkovich 1999]. However, this article is mostly going to rely on South Asian 
literature.
At the current stage, the following factors defi ne the context of relations between 
India and Pakistan in the nuclear domain:
• Common border with unresolved territorial disputes;
• Common border with China, which is also a nuclear power;
• Signifi cant disproportion in size, population, economic and conventional 
military capabilities;
• Technological development misbalance in terms of early warning, space and 
ballistic missile defense programs;
• Strong desire to preserve and improve second-strike capabilities;
• The peculiar system of values and national risk-taking temper;
• Lack of formal dialogue, when contacts between the counterparts are repre-
sented, by large, by track 2 and 1,5 diplomacies.
The constant rivalry and confl icts between the two nations taught them to be 
cautious, so such a sensitive fi eld as nuclear arms control could not remain unat-
tended. The fi rst attempt to reach an agreement occurred in 1988. That year the par-
ties signed an agreement on the prohibition of attack against nuclear installations 
and facilities. The agreement established a common understanding of the meaning 
of the terms nuclear installations and facilities and prescribed to inform each other 
annually about the coordinates of their A-bomb facilities [Treaty on the Prohibition 
of Attack 1988]. Pakistan initiated these negotiations due to its deep concerns about 
the possible attack on its nuclear plants, as it happened when the Israeli attacked 
the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981 [Khan F. 2012]. India, in its turn, was 
concerned about the vulnerability of its nuclear facilities after F-16 jets were sup-
plied to Pakistan by the USA [Khan F. 2010]. The agreement granted both countries 
some kind of assurance against a surprise attack on the nuclear facilities or attacks 
on them in case of war [French 2019].
The next and the largest in terms of signifi cance attempt took place in February 
1999. By that moment, both countries openly demonstrated their nuclear capabili-
ties and started to reshape their security policies incorporating atomic weapons. 
The Lahore Declaration accompanied by the Memorandum of Understanding 
became the fi rst step of rapprochement, which became possible thanks to Indian 
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and Pakistani prime ministers’ efforts, both of whom represented democratically 
elected leaders, A. Vajpayee and N. Sharif, respectively. The declaration became 
the fi rst formal document, which directly addressed the issue of Indian-Pakistani 
nuclear arms control. The states agreed to:
Intensify their efforts to resolve security issues, fi rst and foremost the issue 
of Jammu and Kashmir;
• Intensify their bilateral dialogue;
• Take measures to reduce nuclear risks;
• To discuss concepts and confi dence-building measures within nuclear and 
conventional domains to prevent confl icts;
• To combat terrorism [The Lahore Declaration 1999].
The memorandum’s text reinforced the provisions of the declaration but did not 
have a legally binding character. Thus, it became a kind of a list of recommendations 
which India and Pakistan agreed to follow. The text of the memorandum supposed 
that India and Pakistan shall:
• Establish bilateral consultation groups, discussing conventional and nuclear 
weapons-related issues;
• Establish a system of ballistic missile fl ight tests notifi cation, having a bilat-
eral agreement as a foundation;
• Establish measures, reducing nuclear risks through notifi cations and infor-
mation exchange;
• Sustain their unilateral moratoriums on the nuclear tests, unless the supreme 
interests of the countries are not jeopardized; 
• Establish and maintain Confidence Building Measures [Memorandum 
of Understanding 1999].
This initial dialogue could become a good foundation for further improve-
ments in regional stability. Still, the instability of the Pakistani political system and 
disagreement between Pakistani prime minister N. Sharif and Chief of army staff 
and Chairman Joint Chiefs P. Musharraf provoked the confl ict known as Kargil War 
in May 1999. This clash signifi cantly undermined Indo-Pakistani relations (offi cial 
Islamabad denied its participation in the confl ict). Later General Musharraf organized 
a coup d’état overthrowing N. Sharif. The new government did not express the will 
to deepen the dialogue with India in the nuclear domain, thus leading the bilateral 
dialogue to an impasse. Since then, no signifi cant efforts such as the Lahore declara-
tion have been made to regulate these relations on the state level.
The lack of dialogue between the countries determined their further interac-
tion, represented primarily by the principle of action-reaction. The two countries 
are constantly monitoring each other activities. Being in the ‘fog of war’ they try to 
understand the opposer’s intentions, not always successfully.
Doctrinal problems represent one of the most signifi cant issues for the two coun-
tries relations. Since the acquisition of nuclear weapons, it has become necessary to 
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integrate them into general national military doctrines: to defi ne the role of atomic 
weapons, their place in national strategies; to construct a system of command and 
control; to determine the conditions of nuclear weapons use, and other signifi cant 
aspects. India demonstrated a draft military nuclear doctrine in 1999 and then updated 
it in 2003, while its counterpart still has not presented the proposition in a docu-
mented form for several reasons. 
One of the reasons might be Pakistan’s intention to preserve a high level 
of ambiguity in its nuclear strategy making its nuclear deterrence more credible 
to counterbalance its inferiority in conventional forces. Pakistan does not establish 
a clear nuclear threshold to deny the opponent the opportunity for a potential lim-
ited conventional or sub-conventional war. At the same time, to be credible in its 
deterrence, the Pakistani high-ranked offi cials and militaries make offi cial and 
unoffi cial statements, which helps defi ne the basic structure of the nuclear doctrine. 
The domestic and international political turbulence in the late 1990s — early 2000s 
also played an important role. According to some sources, the nuclear doctrine was 
ready to be presented in winter 1999. Unfortunately, the confl ict between India 
and Pakistan in Kargil forced the government to postpone it, thus avoiding further 
escalation. After that, in August the same year, India presented its Draft Nuclear 
Doctrine and Islamabad decide not to show the Pakistani one not to be associated 
with tit for tat approach towards India. The following updated version of doctrine 
was ready to be publicly presented in 2001, but the 9/11 event again created an 
unfavourable context for its announcement. The disclosure of Abdul Qadir Khan’s 
nuclear technology proliferation network, the ongoing war in Afghanistan, and 
internal political fl uctuations were the main reasons for keeping the nuclear doctrine 
secret later. However, deliberate ambiguity is considered now the most effi cient 
option to ensure deterrence [Salik 2016].
Another issue is that the two countries did not develop a shared system of terms 
and concepts that could facilitate the dialogue and the arms control process itself. 
Although both countries declared their adherence to the principle of minimum cred-
ible deterrence, both parameters, “minimal” and “credible”, are not clearly defi ned 
by either party, adding to the existing ambiguity. The Pakistani perception is easier-
understandable, and Pakistan without nuclear weapons cannot counterbalance its 
competitor’s superiority in conventional weapons. The Indian position raises more 
questions. India confronts two nuclear-weapon states, Pakistan and China. It further 
complicates applying the concept of minimum credible deterrence. The weapons 
available to India are not “minimal” regarding Pakistan, and “credible” enough 
regarding China, which deepens the distrust, giving Pakistan reasons to claim that 
India violates the principles declared by the doctrine [Sultan 2018].
The lack of uniformity in the classifi cation of nuclear weapons also introduces 
specifi c diffi culties in relations. The entire atomic potential of India, following 
the existing discourse, is considered strategic and aimed exclusively at deterring 
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a potential adversary. And the principle of ‘no fi rst use’ refl ected in the doctrine 
dictates it. Due to the uncertainty of its proposition, Pakistan is silent about the possi-
bility of using nuclear weapons fi rst. However, it quite openly classifi es the available 
arsenal as strategic and tactical, envisaging the option to use it as a means of warfare 
in case of extremal need [Lavoy 2008].
The issue of the “urgent need” has particular importance. The Indian Proactive 
Operations Doctrine, also known as the Cold Start Doctrine, is one of the main issues 
in Indo-Pakistani strategic relations. This doctrine supposes the establishment and 
deployment of eight mobile groups capable of being used in a limited war to pen-
etrate Pakistani territory and destroy the objects of its nuclear infrastructure in case 
of war. The Indian think tanks designed that strategy to deprive Pakistan of the ability 
to exercise atomic retaliation. It is a violation of the 1988 non-aggression agree-
ment, in Pakistan’s opinion. The doctrine was kept secret by India for a long time, 
and offi cials completely denied its existence until 2017, when the Chief of Staff 
of the Army, General B. Rawat, admitted its actual presence [Unnithan 2017]. After 
that, Pakistan started to accuse India of provocation and a desire to take advantage 
of conventional superiority to unleash a limited war. As a matter of response in this 
area, Pakistan has developed a tactical short-range ballistic missile Hatf IX (Nasr) 
capable of carrying a nuclear warhead with a yield of 0.5–5 kilotons. The missile is 
presented as a counterweight that can be used on the battlefi eld to protect Pakistani 
nuclear facilities [Shukla 2017]. Despite the declared tactical character of the mis-
sile, it contributes to the credibility of Pakistani deterrence, preventing India from 
a conventional attack.
India defi nes the ‘No fi rst use’ as a fundamental of its nuclear posture while 
having 1,237 million troops versus the Pakistani army of 560 thousand people. 
It presents signifi cant conventional superiority, allowing one to rely on it in case 
of confl ict without using nuclear weapons [The Military Balance 2020]. This is 
why Pakistan tends to rely on its nuclear forces, reserving the possibility to use its 
nuclear weapons fi rst. Nevertheless, it is necessary to take into account, that under 
its nuclear doctrine, released in 2003 India adheres to the massive retaliation strat-
egy, planning to use all strategic nuclear forces in case of an atomic, chemical or 
biological attack against Indian troops inside or outside India [Government of India, 
2003]. However, this raises skepticism on the part of Pakistan, which views a mas-
sive retaliation scenario as unlikely in response to the limited use of tactical nuclear 
weapons. And it also undermines the “credibility” of Indian deterrence. 
The above-described case is a good illustration of the action-reaction principle 
of India-Pakistani relations in the nuclear arms control domain, given the absence 
of a dialogue between the governments. Strategists and intelligence services of both 
countries permanently monitor each other initiatives and activities to respond effec-
tively to the new challenges without direct contact. However, it is not the only pos-
sible way to interact in the fi eld, even in the existing circumstance of high-degree 
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mutual distrust. One of the alternatives is implementing some confi dence-building 
measures to decrease mistrust and create a favourable environment for further 
cooperation.
Some might defi ne confi dence-building measures (CBM) as ‘planned procedures 
to prevent hostilities, to avert escalation, to reduce military tension, and to build 
mutual trust between countries’ [French 2019]. Throughout the 70-year-long history 
of their relations, India and Pakistan had some experience of confi dence-building 
measures development. The aftermath of the third Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 was 
a hotline between Indian and Pakistani directors-general of military operations 
as a backchannel for further crisis resolution and the Simla Accord, containing 
the provision of non-interference in one another affairs and non-use of force [French 
2019]. The 1988 Agreement on the Non-Attack of Nuclear Facilities is also consid-
ered a military CBM, which opened the way to some non-military measures, such 
as the Cultural Cooperation Agreement and the establishment of the crisis hotline 
between Indian and Pakistani prime ministers. 
After the 1998 nuclear tests, the two countries realized the necessity to nego-
tiate, but still, the level of distrust was too high, which could not allow full-scale 
cooperation. The Lahore Declaration and Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
were designed to set up a ground for more concrete measures. Even though the Kar-
gil War signifi cantly undermined the prospects for negotiations and the coup d’état 
in Pakistan, the two countries understood the need to bring more clarity to the general 
atmosphere of uncertainty in the nuclear weapons-related fi eld. 
The fi rst signifi cant measure in the nuclear domain designed to prevent the fad-
ing of the Lahore agreement was the agreement on pre-notifi cation of ballistic 
missile fl ight tests, which included a direct reference to MOU in its preamble 
[Memorandum of Understanding 1999]. The agreement aims to ease the tension 
in the border areas: to ‘prevent misunderstandings and misinterpretations and 
promote a stable environment of peace and security between the two countries, 
by early notifi cations about fl ight tests of land, sea, surface-to-surface ballistic 
missiles. The agreements also prescribed the territories where the tests can take 
place and established limitations on trajectories of the ballistic missiles so that 
they would not cross the borderline or the Control Line established in Kashmir 
[Agreement on pre-notifi cation 2005].
This agreement yelped to decrease the probability of escalation in a confl ict that 
can be caused by a misperception of a missile fl ight test as an attack by any party. 
Its signifi cance is crucial due to the geographical proximity of the parties.
The 2007 Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating 
to Nuclear Weapons became the next one and the last attempt to reach an agree-
ment in the nuclear arms control domain. Again, its preamble refers to the spirit 
of the 1999 MOU between the parties [Agreement on Reducing the Risk 2007]. 
The agreement was designed to encourage the parties to enhance nuclear security 
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and safety on the related facilities to avoid situations, which could provoke radio-
active catastrophe or other acts, able to cause an outbreak of nuclear war between 
the parties [Agreement on Reducing the Risk 2007]. It also envisaged the exchange 
of notifi cations through hotline links established between the Foreign Secretaries 
and Directors General of Military Operations and set up the procedure of consulta-
tions. The term was fi ve years, with the opportunity to be extended for another fi ve 
years, so it was renewed in 2012 and 2017.
It is possible to see that the described measures taken in the fi eld do not restrict 
any development, production or deployment of nuclear weapons. Most of them are 
non-binding as there is no political will to limit somehow A-and-H-bombs. Thus, 
confi dence-building measures fi rst and foremost contribute to reducing the risk 
of war and establishing some additional communication channels. Unfortunately, 
no country uses them actively.
Pakistan tends to be more proactive in the fi eld. There are several reasons for it. 
The main is a disparity in economic development. Pakistan tries not to be involved 
in an uncontrolled nuclear weapons arms race with India. Pakistan made various 
offers to India, ranging from a nuclear-weapons-free zone in South Asia to joint 
inspections and limitations of the certain technologies development and deployment 
of some weapons systems [FAS 1998].
One of the brightest initiatives was to create a so-called “Zero Missile Zone” 
to limit the missile race between India and Pakistan. The initiative included the pro-
hibition of permanent deployment of ballistic missiles, establishing an effective 
system of notifi cation about missile fl ight-tests and restricting the development and 
deployment of anti-ballistic systems [Jaspal 2005]. All these measures are supposed 
to reduce the pace of the arms race and respective spending. India accepted only 
one of these propositions — the system of notifi cations.
Another important concept that Pakistan has been trying to promote since 
October 1998 is the Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR), aimed at proportionate 
reduction in the armed forces and peaceful resolution of all lingering disputes 
between India and Pakistan. According to the initiative it was supposed that India 
would have approximately 100 nuclear warheads, so Pakistan would follow suit, 
possessing a matching number of warheads [Chaudhry 2016]. India rejected this 
proposal because its deterrence is directed not only against Pakistan but also China. 
Nowadays, these conditions are not acceptable to either party. However, Pakistan 
sometimes recalls the old initiative with corrections. Recently there was an attempt 
to apply the SRR initiative to possible MIRV fl ight testing [Khan Z. 2019].
Summing up, it is possible to say that Indian-Pakistani relations represent 
a complex set of issues, with the fl ourishing atmosphere of mutual distrust, lacking 
the offi cial dialogue between Indian and Pakistani governments. For more than two 
decades after the states acquired nuclear weapons, they still lack a shared concep-
tual basis and common language in the fi eld, making timid attempts after a failed 
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rapprochement in 1999. The efforts taken by Pakistan in the area of nuclear arms 
control can be conditionally divided into three groups:
Fundamental initiatives aimed at laying a fundament of a future dialogue — 
Lahore declaration and MOU;
Propositions on confi dence-building measures, designed to reduce the tension 
in relations with India and decrease nuclear risks — Agreement of pre-notifi cation 
of ballistic missile fl ight tests, Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents 
Relating to Nuclear Weapons; 
Initiatives, deriving from strategic considerations, aimed at bringing India 
to negotiations on restraints, limitations and prohibitions of nuclear weapons — 
Strategic Restraint Regime, “Zero Missile Zone” Proposal, and so on.
The relations between India and Pakistan are complex. Still, they lack a cri-
sis management experience, but the main achievements, reached by the sides by 
the current moment are the establishment of the backchannels for communication, 
adherence to the responsibilities of the reached agreements and gradual improve-
ment of the strategic environment by confi dence-building measures, which proved 
to be respected and extended after their expiration dates. Nevertheless, the steps 
taken are not enough to classify the existing relations between the two countries as 
an effi cient arms control regime. But these measures altogether might be considered 
as a certain arms control system from the South Asian perspective.
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